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Compulsory Process and the War on Terror:  
A Proposed Framework 
Megan A. Healy∗ 
On December 11, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft 
announced the indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui, a self-
confessed member of al Qaeda, on six counts of conspiracy re-
lating to the 9/11 attacks.1 Moussaoui remains the only person 
charged in connection with the 9/11 attacks.2 Though the in-
dictment contained grave accusations,3 the prosecution soon hit 
a constitutional roadblock. Moussaoui invoked his constitu-
tional right to compulsory process, requesting access to al 
Qaeda members in U.S. custody to obtain exculpatory evi-
dence.4 The government refused the request, citing national se-
curity concerns.5 This clash between the defendant’s constitu-
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 1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Indicts 
Moussaoui for September 11 Attacks (Dec. 11, 2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2001/December/01_ag_641.htm. Four of the charges carry the penalty 
of death, while two qualify for a maximum of life in prison. Id. 
 2. Viveca Novak, How the Moussaoui Case Crumbled, TIME, Oct. 27, 
2003, at 32, 32. 
 3. See Press Release, supra note 1. 
 4. Susan Schmidt, Prosecution of Moussaoui Nears a Crossroad: Facing 
Demands for Witness Testimony, Government May Turn Suspect Over to U.S. 
Military, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at A8; Philip Shenon, Court Papers Show 
Moussaoui Seeks Access to Captured Al Qaeda Members, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2002, at A20. 
 5. Jerry Markon, U.S. Admonished in Terror Case: Government Must 
Give Moussaoui Relevant Material, Judge Says, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2003, at 
A9. 
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tional right to compulsory process and the government’s na-
tional security interests emerged as the focal point of the case. 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminal defendants 
the right to compulsory process, stating that “the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor.”6 Compulsory process grants “criminal 
defendants the subpoena power [of the court] for obtaining wit-
nesses in their favor.”7 This right implicitly embodies the right 
to discover exculpatory evidence in the possession of the gov-
ernment.8 Unlike other Sixth Amendment rights, compulsory 
process does not require the government to adhere to certain 
standards by which criminal trials must proceed, but rather 
functions wholly upon the defendant’s initiative and affords 
him affirmative aid to present his defense.9 
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Moussaoui10 
marked the first time that a federal appellate court addressed 
the issue of protecting a terrorism defendant’s right to compul-
sory process since the 9/11 attacks and the advent of the War 
on Terror. The Fourth Circuit employed a balancing test in an 
attempt to protect both Moussaoui’s right to compulsory proc-
ess and the government’s asserted national security interest.11 
Because the ultimate resolution of this case came from a guilty 
plea, the Supreme Court has not articulated a framework dic-
tating how to effectuate the compulsory process rights of terror-
ism defendants in the civilian criminal justice system. 
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court’s compulsory proc-
ess jurisprudence and proposes a constitutional framework for 
fulfilling a defendant’s right to compulsory process in the con-
text of the War on Terror. Part I describes the evolution of 
compulsory process jurisprudence in the United States. Part II 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 7. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 306 (8th ed. 2004). 
 8. See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957) (“‘So far as [law-
fully suppressed documents] directly touch the criminal dealings, the prosecu-
tion necessarily ends any confidential character the documents may pos-
sess . . . .’” (quoting United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 506 (2d Cir. 
1944) (Hand, J.))); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34 (Marshall, Circuit 
Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (“In the provisions of the constitu-
tion . . . which give to the accused a right to the compulsory process of the 
court, there is no exception whatever.”).  
 9. Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 73, 
74 (1974). 
 10. 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
 11. See id. at 469–76. 
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details the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Moussaoui. Three sec-
tions compose the framework proposed in Part III: Part III.A 
calls for a rejection of the current balancing test in favor of a 
per se rule as the constitutional standard for all compulsory 
process cases; Part III.B incorporates the current constitutional 
standard of materiality with respect to compulsory process in 
terrorism cases; and Part III.C outlines remedies for violations 
of the right to compulsory process appropriate to the context of 
the War on Terror. Finally, Part III.D applies this new frame-
work to Moussaoui. This Note concludes that the government 
cannot circumscribe a criminal defendant’s constitutional right 
to compulsory process in the civilian criminal justice system by 
pleading national security: once a defendant meets the materi-
ality threshold, the government must produce the requested 
exculpatory evidence or accept the consequences of violating 
the defendant’s right to compulsory process.12 
I.  THE LAW OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
Any discussion of compulsory process must begin with an 
overview of its jurisprudential development. This examination 
recounts the development of the compulsory process doctrine 
from its inception at common law through its incorporation into 
the U.S. Constitution. It then discusses judicial interpretation 
of the clause and details the scope and limitations of compul-
sory process. Finally, it analyzes the constitutional tests that 
have emerged from Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, a sis-
ter clause to compulsory process. Part I reveals that, until re-
cently, the Supreme Court advanced a robust compulsory proc-
ess doctrine, holding this and other Sixth Amendment rights 
paramount in ensuring a fair trial. 
A. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
The emergence of compulsory process paralleled the trans-
formation of the justice system from an inquisitional to an ad-
versarial process.13 By the early 1400s, the jury trial had as-
sumed its modern function, with jurors deciding guilt or 
 
 12. This Note addresses the prosecution of terrorism defendants in the 
civilian criminal justice system. It does not preclude the possibility of prose-
cuting terrorism defendants in a military tribunal established under the 
President’s war powers. While there may be serious constitutional issues in-
herent in such a prosecution, this Note focuses instead on the constitutional 
issues presented by a prosecution in an Article III court. 
 13. Westen, supra note 9, at 78. 
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innocence based on the testimony of independent witnesses 
produced by the Crown.14 However, the defendant possessed 
few rights to guard against prosecutorial abuse and to rebut 
the accusations against him.15 The system forbade defendants 
from producing witnesses, either voluntarily or through a 
summons, to testify on their behalf.16 This system left criminal 
trials during the 16th century “primarily one-sided inquests 
into the truth of the prosecution’s charges.”17 
While the common law rule regarding defense witnesses 
gradually evolved, affording the defendant more procedural 
rights,18 not until the 1600s did the accused receive limited 
power to subpoena witnesses and have them sworn before the 
courts.19 Throughout the 1600s, the right to compulsory process 
developed rapidly, driven by the famous treason trial of Sir 
Walter Raleigh and a backlash against governmental abuses.20 
Completing the transition from an inquisitional to an adversar-
ial system, Parliament passed the Bill of Rights in 1689, codify-
ing many criminal-procedure rights later embodied in the 
American Bill of Rights—including the right to compulsory 
process.21 
B. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF COMPULSORY PROCESS IN THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 
The right to compulsory process followed the colonists from 
England to the American colonies and developed contempora-
neously with English common law.22 The fact that nine of the 
thirteen colonies explicitly included the right to compulsory 
process when drafting their constitutions following independ-
 
 14. Id. at 80–81. 
 15. As Peter Westen notes, the Crown denied defendants knowledge of the 
charges against them until the day of the trial, the right to counsel, the right 
to confront witnesses, and the right to present either voluntary or compelled 
witnesses in their favor. See id. at 82. The Sixth Amendment embodies these 
criminal procedure rights. See U.S. CONST. amend VI. 
 16. Westen, supra note 9, at 83–85. 
 17. Id. at 82. 
 18. See id. at 82–87. 
 19. See id. at 85–87. 
 20. See id. at 87–90. 
 21. See 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 230–36 (2d 
ed. 1938); Westen, supra note 9, at 89. 
 22. See FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITU-
TION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 13–
30 (1951). 
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ence demonstrates the pervasive presence of compulsory proc-
ess in the common law.23 By the time the Framers set out to 
draft the Constitution, the evolution of common law had “firmly 
entrenched” the right to compulsory process in the American 
criminal-procedure scheme,24 representing the “culmination of 
a long-evolving principle that the defendant should have a 
meaningful opportunity, at least on par with that of the prose-
cution, to present a case in his favor through witnesses.”25 
As such, the Framers codified criminal-procedure safe-
guards in the Constitution26 to protect those rights which they 
believed England had violated.27 However, some feared that in-
cluding only a trial-by-jury clause28 would insufficiently protect 
an accused rights as they existed at common law and thus de-
manded that these rights be more clearly articulated in an 
amendment to the Constitution.29 To quell these fears as to the 
right to compulsory process, James Madison, the architect of 
the Sixth Amendment,30 incorporated the following text: “In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”31 
C. EARLY INTERPRETATION OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
While documents from the founding era do not explain 
Madison’s reasons for phrasing this clause as he did,32 contem-
 
 23. See generally 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCU-
MENTARY HISTORY 179–379 (1971) (providing an exposition into American 
colonies’ postindependence constitutions). 
 24. ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JU-
RISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 115 (2002). 
 25. Westen, supra note 9, at 78. 
 26. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. 
 27. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 20–21 (U.S. 1776) 
(listing denial of criminal procedural rights among the grievances justifying 
the colonies’ split from England). 
 28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 29. See Westen, supra note 9, at 96–97. 
 30. See GARCIA, supra note 24, at 115. 
 31. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Professor Westen notes that records do not 
contain Madison’s reasons for drafting the Compulsory Process Clause with 
this particular wording. While the rest of the Sixth Amendment language 
closely paralleled the language of state constitutions, this clause is loosely 
comparable only to Blackstone’s Commentaries. See Westen, supra note 9, at 
97. On the other hand, Francis Heller suggests that, in composing the Sixth 
Amendment, Madison considered the compulsory process clauses of each state 
constitution and formulated a hybrid to satisfy all states and offend none. See 
HELLER, supra note 22, at 21–30. 
 32. See Westen, supra note 9, at 97. 
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porary reactions to the clause shed light on its original mean-
ing. Congress and the states adopted the Compulsory Process 
Clause practically without comment or substantive change.33 
The paucity of debate regarding the narrow construction of the 
text leaves the impression that Madison’s contemporaries did 
“not appear to have attached any significance to the narrow 
wording of the compulsory process clause.”34 These observa-
tions support the theory that the U.S. Constitution codified the 
meaning of the right at common law. 
In addition to gleaning the original meaning of the right 
from historical documents, an early judicial interpretation of-
fers insight as to how courts understood the right at that time. 
Chief Justice Marshall’s “sweeping construction” of compulsory 
process in the trial of Aaron Burr shows that the original un-
derstanding of the right was not limited to the literal text of the 
amendment, but also considered contextual factors.35 In 1807, 
allegations regarding Burr’s loyalty arose in letters from Gen-
eral James Wilkinson to President Thomas Jefferson.36 Jeffer-
son informed Congress that Burr intended to take over the 
Western states, invade Mexico to provoke a war with Spain, 
and establish a new state.37 During his trials for treason and a 
misdemeanor, Burr moved to compel Jefferson and the U.S. at-
torney to produce the letters,38 alleging that the information 
contained therein “‘[m]ay be material to his defence.’”39 Jeffer-
son refused to produce the letters, citing executive privilege.40 
Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as the trial judge, held that 
no witness, even the President, could claim an exemption from 
the provisions of the Sixth Amendment.41 Additionally, Mar-
shall construed the text of the clause, which referred only to 
 
 33. Id. at 98. 
 34. Id. at 98–100. 
 35. See id. at 101 & n.128 (referencing United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 
187 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); United States v. 
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d)). 
 36. See id. at 102. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. at 103. At least two subpoenas were issued, one to Jefferson on 
June 13 for an October 21 letter and one to the U.S. attorney on September 4 
for the November 12 letter. Id. 
 39. Id. (quoting 1 DAVID ROBERTSON, REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF COLO-
NEL AARON BURR 132, 136–43, 149–50 (Philadelphia, Hopkins & Earle 1808)) 
(alterations in original) (emphasis omitted). 
 40. Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 31. 
 41. Id. at 33–34 (noting that every criminal defendant has a right, as a 
matter of course, to the use of compulsory process). 
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process for “witnesses,” to encompass the right to compel a wit-
ness to produce documents.42 He also interpreted the right to 
compulsory process to include a standard of materiality, requir-
ing a defendant to make a credible showing that the informa-
tion or witnesses sought will provide material assistance to his 
defense before invoking the right to compulsory process.43 
D. REVIVAL OF COMPULSORY PROCESS JURISPRUDENCE: 
THE MODERN INTERPRETATION 
Marshall’s broad interpretation of compulsory process 
stood largely untouched for more than 150 years until the Su-
preme Court resurrected the Compulsory Process Clause as the 
foundation for its decision in Washington v. Texas.44 Washing-
ton characterized compulsory process as a “fundamental ele-
ment of due process law” and likened it to the right to present a 
defense.45 This characterization—recognition of compulsory 
process as a fundamental right—set off a revival of compulsory 
process jurisprudence. 
A Texas jury convicted Jackie Washington of murder.46 He 
argued that he did not shoot the victim and that he tried to dis-
suade his codefendant, Fuller, from shooting him.47 Fuller’s tes-
timony would have corroborated Washington’s testimony, ex-
culpating Washington.48 However, to prevent fabricated 
testimony by codefendants, Texas state law forbade Fuller from 
testifying.49 As a result, the court convicted Washington of 
murder.50 
Upon review, the Supreme Court first held that the right to 
compulsory process was incorporated by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.51 In strong terms, the Court 
placed the defendant’s right to compulsory process on an equal 
 
 42. Id. at 35 (“The literal distinction which exists between the cases is too 
much attenuated to be countenanced in the tribunals of a just and humane 
nation.”). 
 43. Id. at 35–36 (requiring a special affidavit showing the materiality of 
the testimony before the access would be granted). 
 44. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
 45. Id. at 19. 
 46. Id. at 15. 
 47. Id. at 16. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 16–17, 20–21. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 17–19. 
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level with other Sixth Amendment rights.52 The Washington 
Court explained that a court’s interest in preventing perjury 
yields to the defendant’s right to present “relevant, probative 
evidence,” and that evidentiary rules preventing the jury from 
hearing such evidence violate the defendant’s right to compul-
sory process.53 The Court found that the trial court “arbitrarily” 
denied Washington his right to compulsory process by refusing 
to allow him to present a witness who was “physically and men-
tally capable of testifying to events that he had personally ob-
served, and whose testimony would have been relevant and 
material to the defense.”54 Washington established that the fact 
finder must hear testimony material to the defense despite the 
possibility of presenting unreliable or perjured testimony.55 
Implicit in this ruling is that the jury, not the judge, must 
weigh the credibility of the witnesses produced by the defen-
dant to support his defense.56 
Throughout the 1970s, Supreme Court decisions estab-
lished a robust compulsory process doctrine based on the inter-
pretation promulgated in Washington. Webb v. Texas57 affirmed 
the central tenet of Washington that the “defendant has a right 
to present a defense coextensive with the prosecution’s right to 
present its case,”58 and that it is up to the jury to decide “where 
the truth lies.”59 In Chambers v. Mississippi, the Court deter-
mined that the defendant’s right to present witnesses in his de-
fense trumped the procedural hearsay rule, effectively ruling 
that substantive justice via compulsory process overrides pro-
cedure.60 Other cases upheld a defendant’s right to compulsory 
process over a conflicting state evidentiary rule, finding that 
the substantive right of compulsory process trumped the state’s 
 
 52. Id. at 18. 
 53. GARCIA, supra note 24, at 128. 
 54. 388 U.S. at 23. 
 55. Id. at 21. 
 56. See GARCIA, supra note 24, at 119; cf. Cool v. United States, 409 U.S. 
100, 104 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that instructing a jury to consider evi-
dence from a defense witness only if extremely reliable violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to present to the jury exculpatory testimony of an accom-
plice per Washington v. Texas). 
 57. 409 U.S. 95 (1972) (per curiam). 
 58. GARCIA, supra note 24, at 119. 
 59. Webb, 409 U.S. at 98. 
 60. 410 U.S. 284, 292–93 (1972); see also GARCIA, supra note 24, at 120 
(noting that the effect of Chambers was to allow “the right to present a defense 
[to triumph] over strict fealty to procedure”). 
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interest in procedural regularity.61 
The most high-profile case in this line of cases, United 
States v. Nixon, reaffirmed the central holding of the Burr 
cases.62 The Court held that compulsory process trumps claims 
of executive privilege: “To ensure that justice is done, it is im-
perative to the function of courts that compulsory process be 
available for the production of evidence needed either by the 
prosecution or by the defense.”63 
E. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
Like other Sixth Amendment guarantees, the right to com-
pulsory process is a fundamental, though not absolute, right.64 
Although the Supreme Court gave a sweeping construction to 
the clause in Washington v. Texas, it has imposed limits on the 
right for a variety of reasons. For the purposes of this Note, the 
limitations regarding materiality, unavailable witnesses, and 
the balancing of interests provide particular insight. 
1. Standard of Materiality 
A materiality standard prevents defendants from gaming 
the system by demanding irrelevant information and placing a 
substantial burden on prosecutorial resources. Since United 
States v. Burr, courts have required a defendant to show that 
the information sought via compulsory process is material to 
his defense.65 
The Court laid down the roots of the modern constitutional 
standard of materiality in Brady v. Maryland, a due process 
case.66 Under Brady, the defendant may discover information 
when the evidence is both “favorable to an accused” and “mate-
rial.”67 Evidence is “material” under the Brady line of cases 
when there is “a reasonable probability that its disclosure 
 
 61. See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987); Crane v. Kentucky, 
476 U.S. 683, 690–91 (1986). 
 62. 418 U.S. 683, 713, 715–16 (1974). 
 63. Id. at 709. 
 64. See, e.g., Rock, 483 U.S. at 52–55. 
 65. United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 36 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, 
C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (requiring a special affidavit showing the ma-
teriality of the testimony before granting access to the evidence); see also FED. 
R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(C) (permitting the defendant to inspect and copy evidence 
in the possession of the government that is “material to the preparation of his 
defense”). 
 66. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 67. Id. 
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would have produced a different result.”68 In United States v. 
Bagley, the Court unified the case law to form the current con-
stitutional standard of materiality, which requires that evi-
dence sought through compulsory process be “favorable to the 
accused,” “material,” and that a “reasonable probability” exists 
that a different outcome would have resulted from its disclo-
sure.69 In the Sixth Amendment context, the Court defined 
such reasonable probability as “a probability sufficient to un-
dermine confidence in the outcome.”70 In formulating this stan-
dard, the Court rejected a sliding scale of materiality.71 The 
Brady standard requires a reviewing court to examine the to-
tality of the circumstances to ascertain if the evidence would 
have been material to the defense, keeping in mind the effect of 
the nondisclosure of material evidence on the defense’s trial 
strategy.72 
The Court has not developed a specific test of materiality 
in the compulsory process context. Rather, the Court relies on 
the due process standard that has evolved from Brady and its 
progeny. In Washington v. Texas, the Court determined that it 
was “undisputed” that exculpatory testimony by Washington’s 
codefendant was “relevant,” “material,” and “vital” to the de-
fense and that its exclusion violated Washington’s constitu-
tional rights.73  
In the context of classified information, courts consistently 
have held that “[i]n appraising materiality, the court is not to 
consider the classified nature of the evidence.”74 In one such 
case, the Court determined that the government’s privilege in 
classified information must give way to a defendant’s right to 
such information upon a showing that the evidence sought “is 
relevant and helpful to the defense . . . or is essential to a fair 
determination of a cause.”75 Once a defendant satisfies this 
 
 68. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 422 (1995); see also United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (articulating an identical formulation of ma-
teriality). 
 69. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
 70. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (examining an in-
effective assistance of counsel claim under the Sixth Amendment). 
 71. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682–83. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967). 
 74. United States v. Juan, 776 F.3d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) 
(citing United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983)). 
 75. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1957). 
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standard, the government must disclose the information.76 
2. Unavailable Witnesses 
The court’s process power will reach an unavailable wit-
ness if that person’s location is known—even if the witness is in 
another state77—or if the government holds the person in cus-
tody.78 Compulsory process does not require the State to pro-
duce a witness if the witness’s unavailability is not the result of 
a state action, such as the witness’s death, disability, sickness, 
or disappearance.79 
Prior to 1982, if the State made a witness unavailable the 
Court required the State to produce the witness. However, in 
1982 the Court decided United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal.80 In 
this case, the government deported two witnesses before the de-
fense had an opportunity to speak with them, knowing that 
both deportees had witnessed the defendant allegedly commit 
the crime.81 An assistant U.S. attorney determined that neither 
witness was “material” to the defense.82 The Court held that 
the deportation of witnesses who may provide relevant evi-
dence for the defense did not violate the Compulsory Process 
Clause per se.83 Absent a showing that the lost testimony con-
 
 76. See United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990). 
 77. See Unif. Act To Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a 
State in Criminal Proceedings § 2, 11 U.L.A. 10–11 (2003); see also, e.g., Mary-
land v. Breeden, 634 A.2d 464, 469 (Md. 1993) (discussing briefly the history 
and purpose of the Uniform Act To Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from 
Without a State in Criminal Proceedings). 
 78. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (2000); United States v. Cruz-Jiminez, 977 
F.2d 95, 99–100 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding that when a defendant asserts his 
Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to obtain the testimony of an 
incarcerated witness, the witness’s testimony may be obtained by the issuance 
of a testimonial writ). 
 79. See Taylor v. Minnesota, 466 F.2d 1119, 1122 (8th Cir. 1972) (holding 
that the trial court is not required to grant a continuance when, despite the 
State’s serving officer’s due diligence, the witnesses cannot be found); United 
States v. Rhodes, 398 F.2d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1968) (deceased witness); United 
States ex rel. Parson v. Anderson, 354 F. Supp. 1060, 1073–74 (D. Del. 1972) 
(dictum) (witness with amnesia); see also Peter Westen, Confrontation and 
Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 
HARV. L. REV. 567, 575–79 (1978) (discussing the limits of the Confrontation 
Clause and the extent to which any given witness is “available”). 
 80. 458 U.S. 858 (1982). 
 81. Id. at 861. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. at 872. This ruling was a shift from earlier case law that ap-
plied a per se rule to similar fact situations. See, e.g., United States v. Tsuta-
gawa, 500 F.2d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding a violation of the defendant’s 
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stitutes evidence “material and favorable” to the defense, the 
Court held that no compulsory process violation occurred.84 
3. Compulsory Process Versus Governmental Interests: 
The Implementation of a Balancing Test 
In addition to modifying the unavailable witness rule, the 
Valenzuela-Bernal Court implemented a balancing test that 
significantly altered the constitutional standard for determin-
ing when the government must afford compulsory process to 
the defendant. For the first time, the Court manifested a will-
ingness to weigh a defendant’s right to compulsory process 
against governmental interests.85 Specifically, the Court 
weighed the government’s interest in not holding aliens who 
“possess no material evidence relevant to a criminal trial” 
against the defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory proc-
ess.86 
The Court found that, as a matter of prosecutorial discre-
tion, the government, rather than the defendant, could ascer-
tain whether or not the witness could provide evidence material 
to the defense before ordering the witness’s deportation.87 To 
challenge the prosecution’s decision, the defendant must make 
a showing of materiality without access to the witness.88 The 
Court recognized the significant burden involved in making 
this showing but found that the “task is not an impossible 
one.”89 The Court found that the government’s bureaucratic in-
terest in not holding aliens until the defendant could assess the 
materiality of their testimony outweighed the defendant’s right 
to compulsory process.90 
In 1988, the Court decided Taylor v. Illinois, in which de-
fense counsel violated a discovery rule that required the defen-
dant to disclose the names and addresses of the witnesses he 
intended to call at trial.91 Employing a balancing test, the 
 
right to compulsory process when the government deported a prospective de-
fense witness without considering the defendant’s interest in the witness’s 
presence at trial). 
 84. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872–73. 
 85. Id. at 864–65. 
 86. Id. at 865. 
 87. Id. at 872–73. 
 88. Id. at 873. 
 89. Id. at 871. 
 90. See id. at 872–73. 
 91. 484 U.S. 400, 403 (1988). 
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Court determined that the countervailing public interests in 
the integrity and reliability of the judicial process outweighed 
the defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory process.92 In 
effect, the Court decided that the defense counsel’s procedural 
error effectively forfeited the defendant’s right to compulsory 
process. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the pub-
lic has an “interest in a full and truthful disclosure of critical 
facts.”93 The Court also held that the discovery violation justi-
fied the preclusion of otherwise admissible evidence, even 
though this remedy resulted in a denial of the defendant’s con-
stitutional right.94 
F. THE SISTER CLAUSE: THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
The Compulsory Process Clause goes hand-in-hand with 
the Confrontation Clause: one provides access to witnesses that 
will exculpate a defendant, and the other requires the State to 
produce witnesses that inculpate the defendant.95 Both rights 
developed through common law, accompanying the transition 
from an inquisitorial to an accusatorial criminal justice sys-
tem.96 Though excellent legal scholarship has fully vetted the 
relationship between, and concurrent development of, these 
clauses,97 a brief overview of the Court’s approach to resolving 
confrontation cases lends insight into what constitutional tests 
the Court may impose to resolve future compulsory process 
cases. 
In the seminal case on the Confrontation Clause, Mattox v. 
United States,98 the Supreme Court formulated a per se rule by 
relying on the original meaning and scope of the clause.99 The 
Court held that, absent an exception recognized at common 
law, direct confrontation of the accuser alone satisfied the de-
 
 92. See id. at 412–14. 
 93. Id. at 412. 
 94. Id. at 402. 
 95. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 96. See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–50 (discussing 
the history and purpose of the Confrontation Clause). 
 97. See, e.g., Westen, supra note 79 passim (discussing the relationship 
between the Compulsory Process Clause and the Confrontation Clause). 
 98. 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
 99. See id. at 243–44; see also Margaret M. O’Neil, Comment, Crawford v. 
Washington: Implications for the War on Terrorism, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1077, 
1082 (2005) (discussing the impact of Mattox on the balance between respect-
ing a defendant’s confrontation right and the admittance of reliable hearsay 
evidence to facilitate the court’s truth finding function). 
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fendant’s right to confrontation.100 In this case, the Court al-
lowed stenographic notes of prior testimony from an unavail-
able witness.101 Because the defendant previously had the op-
portunity to cross-examine the witness, the Court admitted the 
notes into evidence, drawing an analogy to the common law ex-
ception for dying declarations.102 
The Court shifted directions in Ohio v. Roberts, abandon-
ing the constitutional requirement of direct confrontation.103 
The Court moved further from the requirement of direct con-
frontation in Maryland v. Craig when Justice O’Connor, writ-
ing for the Court, found that direct confrontation was “not the 
sine qua non of the . . . right.”104 Justice O’Connor implemented 
a balancing test to determine whether foregoing direct confron-
tation served public interest sufficiently to justify abrogating 
the right to confrontation.105 
Recently, however, the Court made an about-face with re-
spect to testimonial evidence in Crawford v. Washington.106 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion abandoned the balancing test 
from the Roberts-Craig line of reasoning.107 Instead, the Court 
returned to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause 
by recognizing that the only constitutionally sufficient means of 
assessing reliability was to afford the defendant an opportunity 
to directly confront his accuser.108 To effectuate this standard, 
the Court held that prior testimonial evidence is inadmissible, 
unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a 
prior opportunity for cross-examination.109 In so holding, the 
Court rejected the balancing test and re-embraced a per se rule 
requiring the government to produce witnesses to directly con-
front the accused.110 
 
 100. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243–44. 
 101. Id. at 244. 
 102. Id. at 243–44. 
 103. 448 U.S. 56, 62–65 (1980), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 56 (2004). 
 104. 497 U.S. 836, 847 (1990). 
 105. Id. at 855. 
 106. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 107. Id. at 63 (calling the previous framework so “unpredictable” that it 
fails to “provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation viola-
tions”). 
 108. Id. at 68–69. 
 109. Id. at 68. 
 110. Id. This ruling did not overrule the common law exceptions to direct 
confrontation. Id. 
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From its inception at common law through its incorpora-
tion into the U.S. Constitution, the right to compulsory process 
emerged as a key element in the adversarial process. Judicial 
interpretations adopted a broad interpretation of compulsory 
process while refining its constitutional contours. Despite the 
implementation of a balancing test in Valenzuela-Bernal allow-
ing courts to weigh governmental interests against the defen-
dant’s constitutional right,111 compulsory process has remained 
a vital right for criminal defendants. By September 11, 2001, 
the right to compel the production of witnesses in the defen-
dant’s favor had served as a vital tool for criminal defendants 
in the civilian criminal justice system for 200 years. 
II.  COMPULSORY PROCESS VERSUS NATIONAL 
SECURITY: UNITED STATES V. MOUSSAOUI 
On August 16, 2001, the FBI arrested Zacarias Moussaoui 
on immigration charges112 following a tip by an alert flight in-
structor in Eagan, Minnesota.113 Worried that Moussaoui in-
tended to use this flight training for a violent purpose, the FBI 
branch in Minnesota attempted to secure a warrant to search 
his laptop and belongings, but the Washington office denied the 
request, citing lack of evidence.114 The 9/11 attacks gave new 
significance to Moussaoui’s arrest and provided the evidence 
needed to obtain a search warrant.115 
A. THE PROSECUTION HITS A SNAG: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
THE WAR OVER WITNESSES 
From the beginning, Moussaoui disclaimed any involve-
ment in, or knowledge of, the 9/11 attacks. To prove these as-
sertions, he sought access to the architects of those attacks in 
 
 111. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864–65 (1982). 
 112. Novak, supra note 2, at 34.  
 113. Press Release, Pan Am Int’l Flight Acad., Pan Am International Flight 
Academy Statement to the News Media, http://www.panamacademy.com/ 
template_press.asp?id=119 (last visited Apr. 24, 2006). The Minneapolis Star 
Tribune quoted the flight instructor as telling the FBI, “Do you realize how 
serious this is? . . . This man wants training on a 747. A 747 fully loaded with 
fuel could be used as a weapon!” Greg Gordon, A Persistent Suspicion: Eagan 
Flight Trainer Wouldn’t Let Unease About Suspect Rest, STAR TRIBUNE (Min-
neapolis), Dec. 21, 2001, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 114. Romesh Ratnesar & Michael Weisskopf, How the FBI Blew the Case, 
TIME, June 3, 2002, at 24, 26, 29 (referencing a memorandum from Special 
Agent Colleen Rowley to FBI Director Robert Mueller). 
 115. See id. at 29. 
HEALY_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:33:30 AM 
1836 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1821 
 
U.S. custody.116 On September 11, 2002, U.S. forces captured 
Ramzi bin al-Shibh, an alleged coordinator of the 9/11 at-
tacks.117 Moussaoui immediately sought to depose bin al-Shibh, 
but the government refused to provide access to bin al-Shibh, 
citing national security concerns.118 
On January 30, 2003, relying on the guidelines set forth in 
the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA),119 the dis-
trict court ordered the government to produce the requested 
witness in the form of a videotaped deposition pursuant to Rule 
15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.120 The govern-
ment objected, but the district court concluded that Mous-
saoui’s Sixth Amendment right to compel witnesses outweighed 
the government’s asserted national security interest.121 While 
the government pursued an interlocutory appeal of this or-
der,122 coalition forces captured the mastermind of the 9/11 at-
tacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed,123 and Moussaoui quickly 
moved to depose him.124 Mohammed reportedly informed his 
interrogators that Moussaoui played no role in the 9/11 plan.125 
The Fourth Circuit remanded the case to allow the gov-
ernment to propose substitutions that would both ensure 
Moussaoui’s right to a fair trial and protect the government’s 
national security interests.126 However, the district court re-
jected the government’s offer to produce heavily redacted re-
ports of interrogations conducted by U.S. interrogators, finding 
them inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable.127 On July 14, 
 
 116. See Philip Shenon, U.S. Will Defy Court’s Order in Terror Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 15, 2003, at A17. 
 117. Novak, supra note 2, at 34. 
 118. Id. 
 119. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 120. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at 
*5–6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003); 
United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2003) (order de-
nying in part and granting in part defense motions to compel discovery) (under 
seal) (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 15). 
 121. Moussaoui, 2003 WL 21263699, at *5–6.  
 122. See Jerry Markon, Moussaoui Trial Postponed for Third Time, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 13, 2003, at A8. 
 123. See Novak, supra note 2, at 34–35. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Susan Schmidt & Ellen Nakashima, Moussaoui Said Not To Be 
Part of 9/11 Plot, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2003, at A4. 
 126. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 03-4162, 2003 WL 1889018, at *1 
(4th Cir. Apr. 14, 2003). 
 127. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CRIM. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 
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2003, the government filed an affidavit stating that it planned 
to defy the court’s order to produce bin al-Shibh for deposi-
tion.128 The government argued that producing a confessed 9/11 
conspirator, “‘would necessarily result in the unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information’ and that ‘such a scenario is 
unacceptable.’”129 
Both the United States and Moussaoui argued for dis-
missal to expedite an appeal to the Fourth Circuit.130 However, 
the district court, analogizing the situation to cases under 
CIPA, found dismissal inappropriate131 and imposed sanctions 
on the government for defying the court’s orders.132 The court 
removed the death penalty133 and prohibited evidence referring 
to the 9/11 attacks.134 The government appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit.135 
B. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT’S RULING 
The Fourth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment’s Com-
pulsory Process Clause applies to enemy combatant witnesses 
in the custody of the U.S. government outside the United 
States’ territorial boundaries.136 The Fourth Circuit held, for 
the first time, that the testimonial writ reaches a foreign na-
tional in U.S. custody outside the territory of the United States 
 
21277161, at *2 (E.D. Va. May 15, 2003). 
 128. See Shenon, supra note 116. The affidavit was filed by Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft. Id. 
 129. Id. (quoting Attorney General John Ashcroft). 
 130. United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 482 (E.D. Va. 2003) 
(referencing Standby Counsel’s September 20, 2003 Motion for Sanctions and 
Other Relief ), vacated in part, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), amended, 382 
F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
 131. Id. at 482–83 (explaining that the presumption for dismissal under 
CIPA was not appropriate here because it was impractical for the court to 
make a ruling on the admissibility of testimony, as contemplated by CIPA, 
when that testimony had not been obtained). 
 132. See id. at 486–87. 
 133. Id. at 482, 487 (finding that, because the government had deprived 
Moussaoui of the chance to present testimony that could defend his life, impo-
sition of the death penalty would constitute a violation of due process). 
 134. Id. at 487 (finding that the government’s refusal to produce the wit-
nesses would result in an unfair trial because the defendant would be “denied 
the ability to present testimony from witnesses who could assist him in con-
tradicting [the] accusations”). 
 135. See Brief for the United States at 1–2, United States v. Moussaoui, 
365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 03-4792). 
 136. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 464–65 (4th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
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so long as the ultimate custodian, in this case Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld, was subject to the process power of the 
district court.137 The court rejected the government’s argu-
ments that the orders mandating production violated separa-
tion of powers principles by invading the Executive’s war pow-
ers.138 
The court then held that the issuance of orders requiring 
production of witnesses involved “the resolution of questions 
properly—indeed, exclusively—reserved to the judiciary.”139 If 
any separation of powers concerns arose from the orders, they 
would stem from an impermissible burden placed on the gov-
ernment, the finding of which requires the court to balance the 
competing interests.140 In conducting this balancing test, the 
court found the framework provided by CIPA informative.141 It 
held that, although the production of these witnesses imposed 
substantial burdens on the government,142 such burdens could 
not outweigh the finding that the witnesses possessed informa-
tion material to the defense.143 Therefore, the court concluded, 
the “choice is the Government’s whether to comply with those 
orders or suffer a sanction.”144 
The Fourth Circuit noted that dismissal of an indictment 
generally constitutes the appropriate remedy when the gov-
ernment refuses to produce material evidence pursuant to a 
court order.145 However, the court held that where “the Gov-
ernment has rightfully exercised its prerogative to protect na-
tional security,” no punitive sanction will apply.146 Rather, a  
 
 
 137. Id. at 463–66. A few months earlier, the Supreme Court in Rasul v. 
Bush determined that the district court only needed jurisdiction over the de-
tainee’s custodian to reach the detainee, regardless of the detainee’s citizen-
ship. 542 U.S. 466, 478–79 (2004). Unlike the majority in Moussaoui, the Ra-
sul Court did not draw the distinction between the testimonial writ, the 
prosecutorial writ, and the writ of habeas corpus. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 
483 n.1 (Williams, J., concurring). 
 138. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 466. 
 139. Id. at 469. 
 140. See id. 
 141. See id. at 471 n.20 (noting that while CIPA did not apply to the Janu-
ary 30 and August 29, 2003 rulings, CIPA nonetheless provided a “useful 
framework” for examining the issue). 
 142. See id. at 470–71. 
 143. See id. at 476. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See id. 
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“more measured approach” that takes into consideration na-
tional security interests is required.147 
To frame this approach, the Fourth Circuit borrowed a 
standard from CIPA.148 This standard allows the government to 
prevent the disclosure of sensitive national security informa-
tion “by proposing a substitute for the information, which the 
district court must accept if it ‘will provide the defendant with 
substantially the same ability to make his defense as would 
disclosure of the specific classified information.’”149 The court 
concluded that the district court erred in finding any substitu-
tion for actual statements inherently inadequate,150 but agreed 
that the substitutions as proposed by the government insuffi-
ciently satisfied Moussaoui’s right.151 To remedy the substitu-
tions so as to fulfill Moussaoui’s constitutional right, the court 
found that summaries of classified information compiled from 
interrogations of the witnesses “provide an adequate basis for 
the creation of written statements that may be submitted to the 
jury in lieu of the witnesses’ deposition testimony.”152 
The court required that the statements follow the exact 
language of the summaries as closely as possible.153 It ordered 
Moussaoui to designate portions of the summaries for submis-
sion and gave the government an opportunity to respond by 
submitting portions of the summaries the government thought 
the rule of completeness requires.154 Based on this interactive 
process, the circuit court believed that the district court would 
compile a set of appropriate substitutions.155 Additionally, be-
cause the substitutions were summaries of statements made 
over several months rather than actual statements, the district 
court must inform the jury of the nature of the substitutions.156 
 
 147. See id. 
 148. See id. at 476–77. 
 149. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 477 (quoting 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1) (2000)). 
 150. See id. at 478. The court rejected the district court’s conclusion that no 
substitute for depositions of the witnesses would adequately satisfy Mous-
saoui’s right to compulsory process. Id. 
 151. See id. 
 152. Id. at 479. 
 153. See id. at 480. 
 154. See id. at 480 n.35. 
 155. See id. at 480. 
 156. See id. at 478. The court stated that the jury should be informed that 
the parties compiled substitutions “derived from reports [Redacted] of the wit-
nesses. The instructions must account for the fact that members of the prose-
cution team have provided information and suggested [Redacted] The jury 
should also be instructed that the statements were obtained under circum-
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The Fourth Circuit’s ruling exposed the difficulties inher-
ent in prosecuting a terrorism defendant in the civilian crimi-
nal justice system. While the court effectuated Moussaoui’s 
right to compulsory process in form, it gutted that right in sub-
stance. By employing a balancing test, the Fourth Circuit al-
lowed asserted governmental interests to emasculate the de-
fendant’s right to compulsory process. Thus, the court failed to 
protect both Moussaoui’s constitutional rights and the govern-
ment’s national security interest. This failure of our justice sys-
tem calls for a new approach. 
III.  THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
The challenges our legal system faces since 9/11 require 
the judiciary to protect constitutional rights in the most diffi-
cult of circumstances. The War on Terror presents challenges 
never before encountered in our constitutional jurisprudence. 
Although Fascism, Communism, and the Cold War brought 
some of these issues to the fore, the 9/11 attacks forced Ameri-
cans to examine the extent of our individual freedoms under 
the Constitution as we have not had occasion to do since World 
War II. At this crucial moment, the judiciary must provide a 
steady voice and rely on the Constitution to keep our nation 
grounded. 
The framework proposed in this Note provides guidance on 
how the courts can fulfill this role with respect to the right to 
compulsory process. It allows the judiciary to maintain its in-
dependence from the political branches in the face of great pub-
lic pressure to bend the rules to combat terrorism. From this 
independent perspective, the judiciary will have the freedom to 
vindicate an accused terrorist’s constitutional rights without 
the pervasive pressure of public opinion bearing down on each 
decision. 
A. REJECTING THE BALANCING TEST: THE ARGUMENT FOR A  
PER SE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE 
Academics and even members of the Court have long criti-
cized the Supreme Court’s reliance on balancing tests to cir-
cumscribe constitutional rights in the face of an opposing gov-
ernmental interest.157 Balancing tests open the door for public 
 
stances that support a conclusion that the statements are reliable.” Id. 
 157. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62–68 (2004) (rejecting 
the use of a balancing test in the Confrontation Clause context). 
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opinion to exert pressure on the Court either to eviscerate or 
amplify constitutional rights. The implementation of such a 
test to curb a defendant’s right to compulsory process is a re-
cent aberration in compulsory process jurisprudence.158 The 
text, history, and original and modern interpretations of com-
pulsory process dictate that the Court should abandon the use 
of a balancing test in all compulsory process cases, not only in 
the context of the War on Terror. The Court should instead re-
vert to a per se rule that grants a defendant access to all excul-
patory evidence within courts’ process power, subject only to a 
standard of materiality. 
1. Early Interpretations of Compulsory Process Call for a Per 
Se Rule 
Constitutional interpretations must begin with the text it-
self. The Sixth Amendment is an imperative.159 The defendant 
“shall enjoy the right to . . . compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor.”160 The express text of the Sixth 
Amendment contains no exceptions or escape hatches for gov-
ernmental interests: all defendants have a constitutional right 
to compulsory process.161 However, a purely textual application 
leaves many questions unanswered. For example, the text pro-
vides only for witnesses, not for documents or other evidence, 
leading to the absurd result of calling witnesses into court 
without access to documents or other evidence to substantiate 
their testimony.162 The text also allows a defendant to compel 
the testimony of any witness, regardless of the relevance of the 
witness’s testimony. Accordingly, the Court has never handed 
down such a literal interpretation of compulsory process. In-
stead, the Court has found the power to subpoena witnesses in-
 
 158. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 414–15 (1988) (determining 
that the “countervailing public interests” in the integrity and reliability of the 
judicial process outweighed the defendant’s constitutional right to compulsory 
process); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 864–65 (1982) 
(implementing a balancing test to determine when the government must af-
ford compulsory process to the defendant). 
 159. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (expressly in-
corporating a reasonableness standard allowing for the use of a balancing 
test). 
 160. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
 161. See Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18–19 (1967); United States v. 
Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 33–34 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 
14,692d).  
 162. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 35. 
HEALY_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:33:30 AM 
1842 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1821 
 
cludes the ancillary power to compel production of evidence in 
their possession or control, as well as their thoughts, memories, 
and opinions.163 
The historical purpose of the right sheds light on the mean-
ing of the text and clarifies these ambiguities.164 As discussed 
in Part I, compulsory process emerged as a corollary of the 
transition from an inquisitorial to an adversarial system.165 
The idea of making the individual defendant equal to the State 
drove the development of compulsory process.166 Because re-
moving the governmental obstacles to a defendant’s right to 
present his defense underpinned this development, an interpre-
tation of compulsory process that allows the government to de-
cide when and to what extent the defendant’s right exists in 
any given case subverts the purpose of the right. Taken in con-
text with the textual imperative, the historical purpose 
strongly supports the rejection of a balancing test through 
which governmental interests can eviscerate the right. 
An examination of the original understanding of the Com-
pulsory Process Clause commands the same conclusion as the 
textual and historical interpretations. As Part I discussed, the 
Declaration of Independence cited the denial of criminal proce-
dural rights as a governmental abuse to strengthen its call for 
independence.167 The Framers recognized the potential for gov-
ernmental abuses and accordingly drafted the Constitution to 
prevent governmental overreach. The Framers did not intend 
for the rights of criminal defendants to ebb and flow with 
changes in the Court’s membership or the political atmosphere 
of the day. A balancing test allows such temporary changes to 
lead to the dilution or denial of categorical constitutional 
rights. This type of unchecked discretion was one of the factors 
leading the Framers to declare independence from England in 
the first place. 
One could argue, counter to this interpretation, that the 
Framers recognized the potential for governmental abuses, but 
 
 163. See, e.g., id. at 34–35 (holding that the right extends to writings); cf. 
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43 (2004) (finding the text of the 
Confrontation Clause similarly insufficient to define the constitutional de-
mands of that clause). 
 164. See, e.g., Washington, 388 U.S. at 19–22; Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 32–34; cf. 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43–50 (relying extensively on the history of the Con-
frontation Clause to ascertain the correct demands of that clause). 
 165. See Westen, supra note 9, at 78. 
 166. See id. at 90. 
 167. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 20–21 (U.S. 1776). 
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intended only to guard against arbitrary abuses.168 By choosing 
such narrow wording, the Framers left the interpretation open 
to extratextual considerations, including governmental inter-
ests.169 However, two counterarguments undermine this prem-
ise. First, while Madison’s narrow wording of the clause creates 
doubt as to its scope, even scholars who disagree as to the pur-
pose of the wording do not espouse the view that the Framers 
intended to allow governmental interests to preempt the right 
to compulsory process.170 Second, one need only look to a con-
temporary judicial opinion for a definitive interpretation of 
compulsory process during the founding era. 
The earliest judicial interpretation of the Compulsory 
Process Clause, United States v. Burr, indicates that an indi-
vidual defendant had the right to compulsory process for excul-
patory information against the State, even when exposure of 
sensitive security information resulted.171 While Burr involved 
issues of executive privilege and compulsory process, and the 
War on Terror involves national security concerns, in both 
cases the nature of the information being compelled involves 
sensitive state-security matters.172 
In Burr, Marshall emphasized the solemnity of the consti-
tutional right involved and gave a resounding affirmation of 
compulsory process as a fundamental constitutional right to 
 
 168. For instance, the constitutional documents of most founding era 
states, while varying in wording and detail, provided “guarantees against ar-
bitrary practices in criminal proceedings.” HELLER, supra note 22, at 21.  
 169. See id. at 24–32 (describing the debates regarding the scope of the 
amendment).  
 170. For example, Westen hypothesizes that Madison drafted the Compul-
sory Process Clause vaguely to build consensus by accommodating various 
states’ interests. Westen, supra note 9, at 97–101. The Framers incorporated 
this amendment in response to significant state pressure to protect citizens’ 
civil liberties, including the right to compulsory process, from abrogation by 
the new, more powerful, federal government. Id. at 96. On the other hand, 
Heller argues that contemporary documents offer no definitive explanation for 
the language of the Sixth Amendment criminal procedure requirements. 
HELLER, supra note 22, at 33. Nevertheless, Heller notes that England’s de-
nial of these inviolable rights, which guarded against arbitrary state practices 
in criminal proceedings, compelled the colonists to declare independence. Id. 
at 21. 
 171. See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34–35 (Marshall, Circuit Jus-
tice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). 
 172. Compare id. at 31–34 (requiring the President to supply a subpoenaed 
letter from General James Wilkinson containing allegations questioning 
Burr’s loyalty), with United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 458 (4th Cir. 
2004) (concerning a subpoena to produce an al Qaeda member, an acknowl-
edged “national security asset”), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
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which no one, not even the President of the United States, 
could claim an exemption.173 Though not explicit, a reasonable 
reading of Burr shows that once the defendant makes a show-
ing of materiality, governmental interests—even sensitive na-
tional security interests—cannot dilute the defendant’s right to 
compulsory process.174 This reasoning further negates the justi-
fication for the Court’s current use of a balancing test to allow 
the government’s interests to preempt a defendant’s right to 
compulsory process. 
Marshall’s interpretation in Burr, along with the textual, 
historical, and original interpretations embraced by this 
framework, conclusively call for the rejection of the balancing 
test and the reinstatement of a per se rule to protect a defen-
dant’s right to compulsory process. 
2. The Modern Era Exposes Problems with the Balancing Test 
Just as an examination of early interpretation concluded 
that government interests cannot undermine a defendant’s 
right to compulsory process, most modern interpretations of the 
Compulsory Process Clause hold that the defendant’s right to 
compulsory process automatically trump any attempted gov-
ernmental claim of interest.175 The seminal modern compulsory 
process case, Washington v. Texas, equated the underpinning of 
the right to compulsory process with the fundamental right to 
present a defense. As discussed in Part I, until 1982, compul-
sory process cases dismissed out of hand the government’s as-
serted interest, holding the defendant’s right to compulsory 
process above state interests once the defendant meets the 
standard of materiality. 
The Court’s implementation of a balancing test in 
Valenzuela-Bernal,176 and later in Taylor,177 deviated from the 
long-standing per se rule laid down in Burr and its progeny. In 
introducing a balancing test to this jurisprudence, the Court 
essentially shifted compulsory process from a substantive con-
stitutional right to a mere procedural rule that can be set aside  
 
 
 173. See Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 33–34. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707–13 (1974); Cham-
bers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294–303 (1972); Washington v. Texas, 388 
U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967). 
 176. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867–71 (1982). 
 177. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410–16 (1988). 
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when the government makes a strong enough showing of inter-
est.178 
Such a danger is even more present in the framework of 
compulsory process in the War on Terror. The results in 
Valenzuela-Bernal and Taylor demonstrate how easily a bal-
ancing test can lead to the evisceration of categorical constitu-
tional rights, even when challenged by secondary governmental 
interests.179 The War on Terror creates significant pressure in 
our courts to subvert constitutional commands as a means of 
combating terrorism. The danger that courts will succumb to 
governmental claims of national security interests in a post-
9/11 world by denying individual defendants their constitu-
tional rights leads down a path from which a return to consti-
tutional rule of law is uncertain. 
Some argue that the government must have the freedom 
and flexibility to protect the nation in the face of terrorism.180 
However, this fails to distinguish between the power necessary 
to prevent a terrorist attack on the front end and the power to 
convict a suspected terrorist on the back end. On the front end, 
Congress and the President work together to pass statutes, ap-
propriate funds, and establish specialized agencies.181 Most im-
portantly, they accomplish these goals within the powers the 
Constitution gives them.182 
However, on the back end, the Constitution demands that 
the government play by a different set of rules. The Constitu-
tion protects the defendant from governmental abuses and in-
cludes no affirmative grants of power to the government.183 Be-
cause such unprincipled tests leave far too much discretion in 
the judiciary, the danger of public opinion and current trends 
influencing courts’ application of constitutional rights advocate 
 
 178. See GARCIA, supra note 24, at 142 (discussing the Court’s shift to a 
“sporting theory” of justice). 
 179. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 408–09 (relying on the government’s asserted 
interest in a reliable justice system); Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 872–73 
(recognizing the government’s interest in deporting aliens). 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 469–71 (4th Cir. 
2004) (recognizing the government’s interest in national security), cert. denied, 
544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
 181. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 
115 Stat. 224 (2001) (“Sept. 18th Authorization”); Homeland Security Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 
 182. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, art. II, § 2. 
 183. See id. amends. IV, V, VI. 
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against the use of a balancing test.184 Even in the short time 
since the implementation of a balancing test,185 courts have be-
gun to chip away at the compulsory process right.186 A per se 
rule requires courts to comply with the Constitution’s categori-
cal commands, diminishing the potential for outside influences 
to undermine constitutional guarantees. 
Since 9/11 and the ensuing War on Terror, the pressure to 
dismiss defendant’s rights in the name of national security 
weighs heavily upon the courts. Rejecting a balancing test and 
reverting to a per se rule will ensure that the judiciary and the 
government remain mindful that though a defendant is 
charged with an act of terrorism, he is entitled to the same pro-
cedural safeguards and constitutional rights as any other de-
fendant. 
3. A Scaliaesque Approach 
The Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence lends sup-
port to the proposed per se rule. As discussed in Part I, the in-
terests involved in confrontation and compulsory process are 
seamlessly intertwined. The Court’s approach to confrontation 
sends a reasonably reliable message about its probable ap-
proach to compulsory process. For many years, the constitu-
tional test for confrontation cases aligned with the constitu-
tional test for compulsory process with each advocating the use 
of a per se rule.187 
However, in 1982 and again in 1990, the Court handed 
 
 184. Cf. Gerald E. Rosen, U.S. Dist. Court, Judge, The War on Terrorism in 
the Courts (July 24, 2004), in 21 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 159, 163 (2004) (“At the 
risk of sounding preachy, if those of us in the Judiciary allow ourselves to be 
caught up in the public fervor surrounding terrorism, to view ourselves as part 
of the government’s war on terror, and to tailor our decisions accordingly, the 
terrorists will have won an important battle because they will have caused us 
to be something less than who we are.”). 
 185. See United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867–71 (1982) 
(establishing the compulsory process balancing test). 
 186. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415–16 (1988) (holding that 
compulsory process does not bar courts from precluding the testimony of de-
fendant’s witness as a sanction for a procedural violation); Valenzuela–Bernal, 
458 U.S. at 873 (holding the Compulsory Process Clause not violated when the 
government deported a witness before the defendant could interview that wit-
ness to establish materiality). 
 187. Compare Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 245–50 (1895) (em-
ploying a per se rule for Confrontation Clause cases), with Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967) (invoking a per se rule for compulsory proc-
ess cases). 
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down opinions construing both clauses. In these opinions, the 
Court implemented a balancing test, weighing governmental 
interests against the defendant’s rights to confrontation and 
compulsory process.188 In each case, the Court determined that 
the public interest sufficiently justified abrogating the defen-
dant’s constitutional rights.189 As applied to the Confrontation 
Clause, this dramatic shift in jurisprudence led to an increase 
in litigation as lower courts tried to define the parameters of 
the balancing test. 
However, in Crawford v. Washington, the Court’s most re-
cent confrontation decision, the Court handed down a clear-cut, 
definitive confrontation rule.190 The Court relied heavily on the 
historical purpose of the right to be confronted by witnesses to 
reach the conclusion that employing a balancing test in the con-
frontation context offended the text of the Constitution and the 
history of the right.191 Justice Scalia noted that “[b]y replacing 
categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balanc-
ing tests, we do violence to their design.”192 The opinion re-
soundingly disposed of a balancing test and reinstated a per se 
constitutional right to confront witnesses.193 
Such a strong rejection of the balancing test in the confron-
tation context supports the call for a rejection of a balancing 
test in compulsory process jurisprudence. The principles un-
derpinning these rights parallel each other.194 The Court in 
Crawford held that the balancing test diluted constitutional 
guarantees by allowing public interests to interfere with cate-
gorical constitutional commands. The use of a balancing test in 
the compulsory process context also has led to the obfuscation 
 
 188. Compare Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 847–49 (1990) (interpreting 
the Confrontation Clause to only establish a preference for face-to-face testi-
mony at trial), with Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 865–66 (justifying the de-
portation of witnesses on public policy grounds). 
 189. See Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (weighing the states interest in protecting 
children against a defendants confrontation right); Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 
U.S. at 872–73 (weighing the government’s interest in the prompt deportation 
of illegal aliens against a defendants compulsory process right). 
 190. See 541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004). 
 191. See id. at 42–56 (extensively reviewing the development of the Con-
frontation Clause over several hundred years to support the Court’s decision). 
 192. Id. at 67–68. 
 193. See id. at 63–68. 
 194. See Westen, supra note 79, at 567–68; Westen, supra note 9, at 73; see 
also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47–52 (discussing the history and purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause). 
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of compulsory process rights.195 Because the constitutional de-
velopment of these rights have mirrored each other, the Court’s 
decision in Crawford to reject the balancing test in favor of a 
per se rule strongly suggests that it would apply the same logic 
to compulsory process. 
The text, historical purpose, original interpretation, and 
modern interpretation uniformly support the notion that the 
right to compulsory process is a categorical constitutional right 
that cannot be circumscribed by the state. As such, an ad hoc 
balancing test that allows governmental interests, such as na-
tional security, to delineate access to compulsory process is 
simply incorrect constitutional doctrine. Abandoning the bal-
ancing test and reinstating a per se rule vindicates the right to 
compulsory process and ensures that all defendants receive the 
constitutional rights afforded by our Constitution. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF MATERIALITY 
Through decades of decisions, the Supreme Court has de-
veloped the standard of materiality that defendants must meet 
to gain access to exculpatory information via the Court’s proc-
ess power. The Court consistently incorporates the general con-
stitutional due process standard, determined by Brady and its 
progeny, into compulsory process jurisprudence.196 Evidence 
must be “favorable to an accused,” “material,” and show a “rea-
sonable probability” that a different outcome would have re-
sulted from disclosure of the evidence.197 A “reasonable prob-
ability” is “a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in 
the outcome.”198 If the defense satisfies the Brady materiality 
test, the government must disclose the information, classified 
or not.199 
One could argue that national security interests change 
the equation and that courts must apply a heightened standard 
when gauging the materiality of sensitive security informa-
 
 195. See, e.g., Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 416–18 (1988); United States 
v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 872–74 (1982). 
 196. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985); Brady v. 
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 36 
(Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). 
 197. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
 198. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984)). 
 199. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (Compulsory Process Clause). 
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tion.200 However, courts have already addressed national secu-
rity challenges to this well-settled doctrine and consistently 
have held that “[i]n appraising materiality, the court is not to 
consider the classified nature of the evidence.”201 One Supreme 
Court decision defined materiality in the context of classified 
information as information that is “relevant and helpful to the 
defense . . . or is essential to a fair determination of a cause.”202 
However, an examination of case law shows that the Court has 
used these terms in a variety of cases when applying the cur-
rent constitutional standard.203 Therefore, the Court’s use of 
this phrase does not denote a special standard of materiality for 
classified information. 
Not only does case law offer no support for a heightened 
standard of materiality, but Congress also codified its view on 
the subject in CIPA. CIPA supports the Court’s constitutional 
standard of materiality with regards to classified information, 
requiring courts to make the initial determination of relevance 
without regard to the nature of the information.204 Thus, Con-
gress joined the Court in requiring courts to determine materi-
ality without considering the nature of the evidence. 
In light of the well-settled nature of the law in this area, 
this framework proposes adopting the constitutional standard 
of materiality in the context of compulsory process challenges. 
C. CRAFTING AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY 
Once a court rules that the defendant has met the requisite 
materiality standard, the court must provide a remedy to vindi-
cate the violation of the defendant’s right if the government 
continues to refuse to produce exculpatory information. When 
crafting a remedy in the context of the War on Terror, one can- 
 
 
 200. The government in Moussaoui made similar arguments. See Brief for 
the United States, supra note 135, at 39–45.  
 201. United States v. Juan, 776 F.2d 256, 258 (11th Cir. 1985); accord 
United States v. Collins, 720 F.2d 1195, 1199 (11th Cir. 1983); United States 
v. Lopez-Lima, 738 F. Supp. 1404, 1411 n.7 (S.D. Fla. 1990). 
 202. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1957). 
 203. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 37 (Marshall, Circuit 
Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d) (stating that the court is unlikely to 
deny a defendant access to evidence in possession of the government in a capi-
tol case if such evidence is truly “essential to his defence”). 
 204. See Classified Information Procedures Act, Pub. L. No. 96-456, § 4, 94 
Stat. 2025, 2025–26 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 4 (2000 
& Supp. 2004)); Collins, 720 F.2d at 1199. 
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not ignore the fact that the defendant will seek classified mate-
rial involving national security interests. 
This proposed framework shadows the CIPA framework205 
and offers three levels of remedies for compulsory process viola-
tions involving terrorism defendants. At the trial level, an al-
ternative to physical production of the witness crafted under 
the CIPA framework satisfies a defendant’s compulsory process 
rights. At the appellate level, provision for an interlocutory ap-
peal allows the government to assert its valid interest in pro-
tecting national security without placing the defendant in a 
jeopardy situation. Should the government fail at both levels to 
provide access to exculpatory information in accordance with 
these provisions, the only remaining remedy is dismissal. 
1. Dismissal Is Inappropriate in the First Instance 
When the government refuses to provide access to exculpa-
tory evidence in its possession, courts ordinarily will dismiss 
the indictment to prevent the violation of a defendant’s consti-
tutional rights.206 Both the Supreme Court and Congress de-
termined that the government’s interest in preventing the dis-
closure of classified information must give way to the 
defendant’s right to present a defense.207 However, the disclose-
or-dismiss dilemma created by such a harsh remedy punishes 
the government for fulfilling its duties as the protector of its 
citizenry and demands a more just resolution. 
One could contend that the imperative text of the Sixth 
Amendment requires an immediate dismissal when the gov-
ernment refuses to comply with the court’s command.208 How-
ever, judges, not the Constitution, provide the remedies for 
such violations. As such, courts have a greater degree of flexi-
 
 205. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1–16. 
 206. See, e.g., Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 672 (1957); Roviaro, 
353 U.S. at 61. 
 207. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c)(1); United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 
148, 154 (4th Cir. 1990) (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of the 
disclosure of classified information). 
 208. The general remedy, as well as the remedy under CIPA, for the viola-
tion of a defendant’s compulsory process rights caused by the government’s 
refusal to produce a witness in violation of the district court’s order is dis-
missal of the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)(2); United States v. Mous-
saoui, 382 F.3d 453, 484 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (Gregory, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part); see also Peter Margulies, Above Contempt?: Regulating 
Government Overreaching in Terrorism Cases, 34 SW. U. L. REV. 449, 479 
(2005) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit should have upheld the district court’s 
remedy, dismissing many of the charges against Moussaoui). 
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bility to consider governmental interests when crafting an ap-
propriate remedy than when deciding whether the government 
violated a categorical constitutional right. Dismissal as a rem-
edy for the violation of an individual’s rights subverts justice if 
it decimates the security of the offending nation. If a less dra-
conian remedy fully vindicates the individual’s rights, a court 
may, in its discretion, consider an alternative remedy that does 
not jeopardize the government’s national security interests.209 
So long as the government’s refusal to produce exculpatory 
evidence stems from its prerogative of protecting the nation’s 
security, such a drastic sanction as dismissal does not serve the 
ends of justice.210 Therefore, resolution of the conflict requires a 
more just remedy, reserving dismissal as a remedy of last re-
sort. 
2. Substitutions Under the CIPA Framework 
Because dismissal in the first instance offends justice, this 
proposed framework suggests a substitution for actual produc-
tion of the witness by analogizing to the CIPA framework. Any 
analogy to CIPA must recognize that CIPA applies only to pub-
lic disclosure of classified information at the trial stage, not to 
disclosure of classified information to defense counsel at the 
pretrial stage.211 However, having no binding legal precedent, 
an analogy to the CIPA framework for crafting a substitution 
for actual production of the witnesses or evidence in question 
proves informative.212 Because CIPA is congressionally sanc-
tioned and judicially tested, its procedures provide insight into 
appropriate methods of producing classified evidence. 
A pure Sixth Amendment analysis leads to unfettered ac-
cess to material exculpatory information by the defense; how-
ever, such access clearly frustrates the government’s interest in 
national security. To address this concern at trial, CIPA implic-
itly requires a balancing test when crafting an appropriate sub-
stitution for admissibility as evidence.213 In this context, after 
 
 209. See United States v. Moussaoui, 282 F. Supp. 2d 480, 482–83 (E.D. 
Va. 2003), vacated in part, 365 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004), amended, 382 F.3d 
453 (4th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
 210. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(e)(2); Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 476. 
 211. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 212. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 
21263699, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th 
Cir. 2003). 
 213. See id.  
HEALY_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:33:30 AM 
1852 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1821 
 
the defendant has reviewed the evidence and determined what 
he needs admitted for exculpatory purposes, employing a bal-
ancing test to determine the form of the evidence does not vio-
late his right to compulsory process.214 So long as the court ad-
mits the substance of the evidence, the Constitution does not 
prohibit a change in form to protect the government’s interest. 
In this vein, CIPA authorizes a substitution to take the 
place of complete access. However, such a substitution must 
provide the defendant with “substantially the same ability to 
make his defense as would disclosure of the specific classified 
information.”215 In the CIPA context, courts have generally ac-
cepted substitutions, such as statements or summaries, in lieu 
of the production of actual witnesses or documents.216 However, 
courts generally cite a lack of specificity when finding substitu-
tions inadequate to convey the evidence to the jury.217 
If CIPA controlled the issue of compulsory process in the 
context of the War on Terror, the defendant must accept suffi-
cient summaries to satisfy his compulsory process rights, ab-
sent a finding of unconstitutionality.218 At this point, the pro-
posed framework departs from CIPA. At trial, for which CIPA 
provides a remedy, the government’s interest in preventing the 
disclosure of classified information to the public weighs heavily 
against a defendant’s right to present a defense in determining 
the form of the substitution admitted into evidence. However, 
in pretrial discovery, the fact that public disclosure is not im-
minent and that defense counsel must obtain a security clear-
ance diminishes the government’s interest.219 Likewise, at such 
an early stage, access to a form of evidence yielding the great-
est amount of information from which a defendant can mount 
his defense substantially enhances his interest.220 
Because the defendant’s interest in the form of evidence is 
so greatly enhanced at this early stage, only a substitution that 
approximates actual access as nearly as possible vindicates the 
 
 214. Cf. id. (comparing CIPA’s legal framework to a defendant’s right to 
bring witnesses to court). 
 215. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c). 
 216. See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 913 F.2d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 
1990). 
 217. See, e.g., id. at 157–59. 
 218. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 6(c). 
 219. See id. §§ 4, 5, 9. 
 220. Cf. Margulies, supra note 208, at 478–79 (discussing the defendant’s 
interest in an effective defense). 
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defendant’s right to compulsory process. The defendant must 
have within his reach the most accurate substitution for excul-
patory evidence on which to build his case. Access to such ma-
terial evidence alters defense strategy, leads to other forms of 
exculpatory evidence, and, at the very least, serves as a miti-
gating factor for the defendant to use as a bargaining chip. 
That being so, in the context of access to witnesses, a depo-
sition—such as the video deposition ordered by the district 
court in Moussaoui221—best satisfies the defendant’s right to 
compulsory process, while creating a controlled environment to 
protect the government’s national security interests. A video 
deposition allows the defense not only to ask questions, but also 
to follow up on answers as a means of uncovering additional ex-
culpatory evidence or witnesses. This manner of deposition al-
lows defense counsel to explore avenues of discussion left un-
touched by the government’s interrogators. This give-and-
take—akin to informal witness interviews usually conducted by 
defense counsel in criminal investigations—provides an essen-
tial tool in crafting a defense. While a video deposition most 
closely approximates actual access to the witness and provides 
the most compelling evidence, under the proposed framework a 
deposition on written questions, reserving to the defense the 
opportunity to follow up the answers with additional questions, 
also satisfies the defendant’s right to compulsory process.222 
On the other hand, summaries and substitutions, such as 
those advocated by the Fourth Circuit in Moussaoui for exam-
ple,223 fail as adequate substitutes for actual access at this 
early stage of the prosecution. Such substitutions are not pre-
pared for use by a defendant to present his defense, but as re-
cords of interrogation for government intelligence purposes.224 
 
 221. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2003) 
(order denying in part and granting in part defense motions to compel discov-
ery) (under seal). 
 222. Cf. id. (requiring a video deposition as the means to effectuate Mous-
saoui’s right to compulsory process). Nevertheless, because they more accu-
rately substitute live testimony, video depositions are preferred if available. 
Cf. Battle v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 228 F.3d 544, 554 (5th Cir. 2000) (hold-
ing that a video deposition was an adequate substitute for live testimony when 
the witness was unavailable); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 
(5th Cir. 1982) (finding that a videotaped deposition, unlike a transcript, al-
lows the fact finder to evaluate the witness by his motions, vocal inflections, 
facial expressions, and demeanor).  
 223. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 479–82 (4th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
 224. Cf. Margulies, supra note 208, at 459–65 (discussing prosecutorial 
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The interrogator’s prerogative does not align with the defen-
dant’s desire to obtain exculpatory information. In pursuing 
governmental objectives, the interrogator may find avenues of 
inquiry fruitless for governmental purposes, unimportant for 
the defense, or advantageous for the government to avoid.225 
Additionally, without specific references to the defendant 
prompted by direct questioning, the impact of any exculpatory 
evidence is greatly diminished. The nature of the substitution 
also frustrates the defendant’s use of such information by deny-
ing the opportunity to extract additional exculpatory informa-
tion. 
In Moussaoui, the government strenuously objected to this 
framework’s proposed remedy by pleading national security.226 
However, when examined under the strictures of the proposed 
framework, this argument is not dispositive. First, the pro-
posed framework does not require the government to disclose 
the location of the witness—the government must only produce 
him via a closed circuit link. Second, the framework quells the 
government’s concern about the scope of the deposition by re-
quiring defense counsel to limit the questions only to the wit-
ness’s direct knowledge of the defendant. The defendant can 
glean all relevant ancillary information from the redacted 
summaries of interrogations. Additionally, under CIPA, defense 
counsel must prove their trustworthiness before gaining access 
to classified information.227 Finally and most importantly, 
when the time comes to determine the form of admissible evi-
dence, CIPA governs the form of the evidence to prevent disclo-
sure of sensitive security information.228 As this examination 
shows, at this point in the prosecution and under these strict 
guidelines, producing witnesses for depositions causes little, if 
any, actual damage to national security. 
Because of the government’s diminished interests and the 
defendant’s enhanced interest at this early stage, requiring the 
government to produce witnesses for depositions will not frus-
trate the government’s security interests and will fully vindi-
 
misconduct). 
 225. See id. 
 226. See Shenon, supra note 116. 
 227. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 4, 5, 9 (2000 & Supp. 2004). 
 228. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 
21263699, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003) (discussing the framework of CIPA, 
“which governs the relevance, use and admissibility of classified information 
at trial”), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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cate the defendant’s rights. This element of the proposed 
framework puts in place the mechanisms to accomplish both 
goals without failing either. 
3. Interlocutory Appeal 
CIPA provides for an interlocutory appeal by the United 
States when the district court orders disclosure of classified 
evidence, the government refuses to comply with the order, and 
the district court imposes sanctions.229 The Fourth Circuit in 
United States v. Moussaoui analogized the CIPA framework to 
cover interlocutory appeals at the pretrial stage in the context 
of compulsory process in terrorism cases.230 However, in recog-
nizing the availability of the appeal, it required that the appeal 
come from a final order of the district court.231 The Court de-
termined that finality meant that the district court issued an 
order to disclose to which the government refused to comply 
and for which the government suffered a sanction.232 
The proposed framework adopts the methodology of the 
Fourth Circuit and provides the government with an interlocu-
tory appeal prior to the disclosure of any classified evidence. An 
appeal will prolong the defendant’s receipt of exculpatory evi-
dence, but a brief delay will not frustrate the defendant’s 
right.233 
4. When All Else Fails, Dismiss 
Despite the serious implications of dismissing the indict-
ment in terrorism cases, the government must accept the con-
sequences of its refusal to provide access to exculpatory evi-
dence as demanded by the Constitution. This framework 
provides ample opportunity for the government to protect its 
security interests, while still providing adequate disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence to the defendant. As the Fourth Circuit 
said, at this point, the choice is the government’s whether to 
produce the evidence or to accept a sanction.234 
 
 
 229. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7. 
 230. See United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 514–15 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Cf. 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 7(b) (requiring an expedited appeal that must be 
taken within ten days). 
 234. See United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 476 (4th Cir. 2004), 
cert. denied, 544 U.S. 931 (2005). 
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A refusal to participate in this process by producing wit-
nesses for depositions signals that the government refuses to 
prosecute defendants according to long-established constitu-
tional rules. The Constitution does not grant Article III courts 
the discretion to bend the rules for the government because the 
defendant qualifies as a terrorist. If the government refuses to 
comply with the remedy for the violation of a defendant’s con-
stitutional rights by providing adequate substitutions, the 
court will have no choice but to dismiss the indictment. 
D. APPLYING THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK TO MOUSSAOUI 
Finally, to exemplify how this proposed framework oper-
ates, this section applies the framework to the Moussaoui case. 
To establish the materiality of the evidence that a particular 
witnesses could offer, Moussaoui relied upon the heavily re-
dacted summaries of interrogation interviews that the govern-
ment made available to him.235 Because the arguments in this 
case regarding materiality at the trial level occurred during a 
closed hearing on January 30, 2003, the position advocated by 
the defense on materiality is not clear.236 The district court 
found that Moussaoui satisfied the constitutional materiality 
standard as to two of the three witnesses.237 
The record shows that the district court applied the consti-
tutional standard of materiality set forth by the Brady line of 
cases.238 Because the proposed framework advocates the adop-
tion of the same standard of materiality, Moussaoui satisfied 
the requisite standard of materiality under the proposed 
framework. 
This proposed framework permits no balancing of the in-
terests to decide whether to allow access to the requested wit-
nesses. The defendant must meet two requirements for access: 
make the requisite showing of materiality of the evidence being 
sought and show that the evidence is within the process power 
 
 235. Id. at 472, 478. 
 236. See United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2003) 
(order denying in part and granting in part defense motions to compel discov-
ery) (under seal). 
 237. United States v. Moussaoui, No. CR. 01-455-A, 2003 WL 21263699, at 
*4 (E.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2003), appeal dismissed, 333 F.3d 509 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 238. Id. The court also cited United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 
858, 867 (1982), for the proposition that the evidence offered may be material 
for either guilt or punishment. Id. 
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of the court. Because Moussaoui met both,239 he must receive 
access to the witnesses. A denial violates his right to compul-
sory process. 
The government raised legitimate concerns regarding 
granting Moussaoui access to the witnesses via deposition, in-
cluding the risk of undermining interrogation and enabling 
signaling. Regardless, in choosing to prosecute Moussaoui in 
the civilian criminal justice system, the government chose to 
abide by the constitutional rules governing that system. There-
fore, the government must not obstruct Moussaoui’s right to 
compulsory process. The proposed framework advocates a for-
mal deposition as the only acceptable means of fulfilling Mous-
saoui’s right to compulsory process. In this determination, the 
result under the proposed framework accords the district 
court’s decision.240 
At this juncture the proposed framework and the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision part ways. Under the proposed framework, 
the Fourth Circuit should have affirmed the district court as to 
the form of substitution ordered and required the government 
to produce the witnesses for deposition. However, the Fourth 
Circuit performed a balancing test to determine that summa-
ries of interrogation sufficed to effectuate Moussaoui’s right to 
compulsory process.241 Although the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s assessment that the form of summary of-
fered was inadequate, it held that the heavily redacted summa-
ries were a sufficient basis from which to create written state-
ments that would serve as Moussaoui’s only access to witness 
testimony.242 
This substitution falls far below the standard advocated by 
the proposed framework. Substitutions based on summaries 
lack specificity to the individual and inhibit, rather than en-
able, a defendant’s discovery of exculpatory information. The 
proposed framework requires that the government produce the 
witnesses for deposition as the only substitutionary means of 
vindicating the defendant’s right to compulsory process. At that 
point, the government must make a choice either to respect the 
Constitution by producing the witnesses, as required in any  
 
 
 239. See Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 456–57, 463–64, 471–74.  
 240. See Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Jan. 31, 2003) (order denying 
in part and granting in part defense motions to compel discovery) (under seal). 
 241. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d at 469–76. 
 242. Id. at 479. 
HEALY_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:33:30 AM 
1858 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1821 
 
prosecution in an Article III court, or to allow the district court 
to dismiss the indictment. 
Ultimately, however, no conclusive answer to this constitu-
tional conundrum will emerge from Moussaoui. On April 22, 
2005, Moussaoui pled guilty to the six counts with which he 
was charged,243 after a denial of certiorari by the Supreme 
Court and after years of thwarted attempts to gain access to 
exculpatory information left him unable to present a full de-
fense.244 As Moussaoui’s death penalty trial played out on the 
national stage, it brought closure to thousands of 9/11 victims’ 
family members; however, it also brought to light the failure of 
the judiciary to protect Moussaoui’s constitutional right to 
compulsory process.  
CONCLUSION 
Moussaoui is the beginning, rather than the end, of the 
story. The compulsory process question remains unanswered, 
and the ongoing War on Terror will assuredly present more 
constitutional crises. Vindicating the constitutional rights of 
suspected terrorists while protecting the government’s legiti-
mate interest in national security will challenge many courts 
throughout the War on Terror. The framework proposed in this 
Note ensures that defendants have access to a remedy for viola-
tions of their constitutional right to compulsory process, while 
clearly laying down the rules the government must follow when 
it chooses to prosecute in an Article III court. Once a defendant 
can demonstrate that a material need exists for evidence in the 
government’s control and that the court has jurisdiction over 
that evidence, courts must effectuate that defendant’s rights. If 
the government fails to provide the exculpatory information, or 
a constitutionally adequate substitution, then the court must 
dismiss the indictment. Put simply, the United States govern-
ment faces a difficult choice: either respect the commands of 
the Constitution required in an Article III prosecution or accept 
the consequences of dismissal. 
 
 243. See Neil A. Lewis, Moussaoui Tells Court He’s Guilty of a Terror Plot, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A1. 
 244. Moussaoui v. United States, 544 U.S. 931, 931 (2005) (Mem.). 
